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Abstract
It is argued that trophy hunting of large, charismaticmammal species can have consider-
able conservation benefits but only if undertaken sustainably. Social-ecological theory sug-
gests such sustainability only results from developing governance systems that balance
financial and biological requirements. Here we use lion (Panthera leo) trophy hunting data
from Tanzania to investigate how resource ownership patterns influence hunting revenue
and offtake levels. Tanzania contains up to half of the global population of free-ranging lions
and is also the main location for lion trophy hunting in Africa. However, there are concerns
that current hunting levels are unsustainable. The lion hunting industry in Tanzania is run by
the private sector, although the government leases each hunting block to companies,
enforces hunting regulation, and allocates them a species-specific annual quota per block.
The length of these leases varies and theories surrounding property rights and tenure sug-
gest hunting levels would be less sustainable in blocks experiencing a high turnover of
short-termleases. We explored this issue using lion data collected from 1996 to 2008 in the
Selous GameReserve (SGR), the most important trophy hunting destination in Tanzania.
We found that blocks in SGRwith the highest lion hunting offtake were also those that expe-
rienced the steepest declines in trophy offtake. In addition, we found this high hunting off-
take and the resultant offtake decline tended to be in blocks under short-termtenure. In
contrast, lion hunting levels in blocks under long-term tenure matchedmore closely the rec-
ommended sustainable offtake of 0.92 lions per 1000 km2. However, annual financial
returnswere higher from blocks under short-termtenure, providing $133 per km2 of govern-
ment revenue as compared to $62 per km2 from long-term tenure blocks. Our results pro-
vide evidence for the importanceof property rights in conservation, and support calls for an
overhaul of the system in Tanzania by developing competitive market-based approaches
for block allocation based on long-term tenure of ten years.
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610 September 20, 2016 1 / 15
a11111
OPENACCESS
Citation:Brink H, Smith RJ, Skinner K, Leader-
Williams N (2016) Sustainability and Long Term-
Tenure: Lion Trophy Hunting in Tanzania. PLoS ONE
11(9): e0162610. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610





Copyright:© 2016 Brink et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricteduse, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement:Data provided in
supplementary information.Data on lion hunting
offtake and quotas for Tanzania’s hunting blocks are
available from the CITES office at the Wildlife Division
headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Lion
trophy export data are available from the CITES trade
databasewebsite (http://trade.cites.org/).
Funding: The research has been made possible by
grants from National Geographic (Grant # EC0274-
06) and Panthera. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to
publish, or preparationof the manuscript.
Introduction
Biodiversity conservation outcomes are closely related to the rules and institutions that govern
the use of natural resources [1–3]. Since the 20th century, statutory protected areas have been a
cornerstone of biodiversity conservation strategies for most countries [4–6]. However, operat-
ing budgets for these protected areas in developing countries cover an average of 30% of their
costs [7] and society seems reluctant to cover the shortfall of conserving biodiversity [8–11].
Thus, there is an increasing recognition of the role of the private sector in funding and manag-
ing conservation [12–14].
In southern and eastern Africa, a prime example of the private sector playing this role
comes from the organised hunting of wild animals by tourists for sport or trophies [15–18].
Areas set aside for the hunting of big game animals protect habitats that might otherwise be
converted to agriculture [19], protect populations of large mammals [20,21], and can benefit
local people [22,23]. However, exploitation of a species always has the potential to reduce pop-
ulations to levels where hunting is no longer profitable, or in extreme cases cause population
extinctions [4,24–26], and legal hunting can have unintended knock on effects by encouraging
illegal hunting [27]. This means that trophy hunting systems need to be developedwith care,
so they encourage the sustainable use of the target species [28]. One key aspect is providing
secure resource tenure [29–31] and so conservationists are increasingly concernedwith gover-
nance dynamics and the need for institutional reform [32–35].
These issues of ownership and tenure are especially relevant for Tanzania, a country that is
hugely important for wildlife conservation and a prime destination for trophy hunters [18,36].
The Tanzanian government has long recognised the global importance of its biodiversity and
has given protected area status to 37% of the country’s land surface [25]. Trophy hunting is
permitted in all protected areas in Tanzania, apart from the National Parks and the Ngoron-
goro ConservationArea. Therefore, hunting occurs on some 305,000 km2, or some 86% of pro-
tected land. Tanzania is recognised for its high quality trophy hunting opportunities [37] and
this remains a principal source of income for vast areas of the country [38]. Moreover, the
hunting industry has demonstrated an impressive growth in recent years and is an important
source of foreign exchange [18,39].
Nonetheless, a review of protected area tenure arrangements in Tanzania noted that all land
is ultimately owned by the state, and may only be leased by companies/individuals for set periods
of time, no longer than 99 years [40]. Hunting companies lease one or several hunting blocks,
which are segments of land designated as a Game Reserve,Game Control Area,Wildlife Manage-
ment Area, or OpenArea (see Fig 1), and the company is allocated a species-specificquota for
each block for the hunting season [41]. A portion of this quota is then offered to clients by the
hunting company, who stay at hunting camps for 1, 2 or 3 week periods depending on species
the client wishes to hunt. Clients wishing to hunt lion are required to purchase a 21-day safari.
Clients may fly between different hunting blocks leased by the same company in order to hunt
different species only found in certain areas. This means that the Tanzanian government has a
lot of control over where and for how long different trophy hunting companies are allowed to
operate, as well as the number of animals that can be hunted by tourists. Thus, their policies and
actions could have a large influence on the ecological and financial sustainability of the industry.
Despite the influence of a national policy on the sustainability of trophy hunting in Tanza-
nia and its major conservation role, very little information is available on the industry and
many aspects are shrouded in secrecy [16,18]. In particular, many of the concessions are leased
to local companies that do not have the capacity to market their hunting opportunities, which
leads to a system of subleasing, mostly to foreign non-resident professional hunters. This has
implications for revenue collection because these hunting opportunities are often cheaply
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subleased and much of the generated income never enters Tanzania, and so cannot be taxed by
the Tanzania Revenue Authority [38]. Furthermore, the blocks are sub-leased for short periods,
which may encourage their over-utilization. Such over-utilization is a particular concern for
lion conservation in Tanzania, as the country supports between a quarter and half of the
remaining free-ranging lions in the world [25,42]. In addition, Tanzania is the most important
destination for sport hunting of lions, exporting an average of 243 wild lion trophies per year
between 1996 and 2006, compared to 96/yr from Zimbabwe, and 55/yr from Zambia, while no
other country exportedmore than 20/yr [43].
One of the most important sites for lion trophy hunting is the Selous Game Reserve (SGR),
a World Heritage Site in the south east of Tanzania. SGR has developed a considerable reputa-
tion as a tourist hunting destination [44] and contains an internationally important lion popu-
lation [45]. Lion populations are declining in most of their range across Africa [42,46,47] and
trophy hunting has been shown to be in need of reform [18,25]. Therefore, here we use data
from SGR to investigate the factors that determine lion trophy hunting sustainability. We
Fig 1. SelousGameReserve and borderinghuntingblocks and national parks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610.g001
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investigate the extent to which lion hunting offtake influences offtake over time and resultant
government revenue. We also look at the differences in lion hunting offtake and government
revenue between hunting blocks with short-term and long-term leases.
Material andMethods
We are grateful for permission and constructive advice from the Tanzania Wildlife Research
Institute (TAWIRI), Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and theWildlife
Division (WD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism to carry out research in
Selous Game Reserve.
Study Area
The Selous ecosystem is an area of 96,643 km2 and contains 64 hunting blocks. Of these, 43
blocks are within SGR, seven are in areas surrounding SGR and have been hunted since the
1990s, while another 14 have more recently been designated and have only been hunted since
2002 [41]. The Selous ecosystem also contains conservation land where trophy hunting does
not take place (National Parks), including four blocks within SGR that are set aside for photo-
graphic tourism (Fig 1). For management purposes SGR is divided into eight sectors (Fig 2),
which we use when reporting some of the results.
SGR is surrounded by a network of different protected areas, namely: National Parks, Game
Control Areas, and Open Areas andWildlife Management Areas (Fig 1). The distinction
between hunting blocks on Game Control Areas, Wildlife Management Areas and Open Areas
is not clear cut, as all allow for human settlement and wildlife to coexist, and hunting is only
permitted under licence. Instead, they reflect when the blocks were established in relation to
different phases of development in national wildlife policies. Game Control Areas are the old-
est, and most were set-up prior to the early 1990s. TheWildlife Management Areas reflect Tan-
zania’s attempt to introduce community-basedmanagement of wildlife in the late 1990s, with
the idea that control of and benefits from wildlife would be decentralised to communities living
in the area. The re-designation of someWildlife Management Areas as Open Areas and the
designation of new hunting blocks in 2004/5 as Open Areas reflect both the central govern-
ment’s move away from devolving power to local communities and the preference of hunting
companies to deal with one central authority [34]. Fees paid by the hunting companies to the
government or local communities are used to provide law enforcement and infrastructure
development. Nonetheless most hunting companies also privately maintain infrastructure (e.g.
roads) and carry out anti-poaching activities within their blocks.
Block BoundaryData
We obtained the digital boundary polygons files of the SGR blocks from the Tanzania Wildlife
Research Institute and the Selous ConservationProject, which was funded by the Organization
for German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The Selous ConservationProject data were from
2003, while the Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute data were more up-to-date and showed
boundaries from 2009. We conducted field visits from June 2006 to August 2009 to the differ-
ent sectors of SGR to investigate the accuracy of these layers and updated them as necessary.
All spatial data were imported into ArcGIS version 9.3 (ESRI Inc., Redlands, CA) for analysis.
Block Tenure and Hunting Fees
We obtained information on which companies leased which block, and on hunting fees, from
theWildlife Division of Tanzania’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Information
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Fig 2. Map of sectors and blocks of SelousGameReserve.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610.g002
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on who owned a specific company, and for how long, including information on subleasing, was
acquired from informants within the hunting industry. We acquired data for the average gov-
ernment income per block and the source of these payments (e.g. block fees or trophy fees)
from the Selous ConservationProject (listed in [38]). These data on income were only available
for blocks within SGR and from 1996 to 2003. We defined long-term blocks as those that were
leased by the same owner and company for at least 10 years, althoughmost of these blocks
have been in the same hands since the early 1990s (>15 years). In contrast short-term blocks
have changed leasers at least once in the 10-year period, with most having changed hands sev-
eral times in this period or having been subleased to several non-resident professional hunters.
Lion HuntingOfftake Data
Data on number of lions killed in each hunting block of SGR were provided by the CITES office
at theWildlife Division Headquarters. In Tanzania, only male lions may be hunted. This hunt-
ing offtake data were much more complete within SGR, as compared to the rest of Tanzania,
due to the activities of conservation development projects (Planning and Assessment for Wild-
life Management & Selous ConservationProject [35,36,39]).We also collected background
information on lion mortality trends through one-to-one discussions with sector wardens,
company owners, and professional hunters. We did not use data on lion population trends
because, while these data have been calculated for the photographic tourism area of SGR [45],
they are not available for Tanzania’s hunting blocks. However, previous researchers have sug-
gested that hunting offtake data are a proxy for this population data, principally because hunt-
ing companies put a large amount of effort into finding lion trophies, and so any changes in
the underlying population are reflected in the number of lions hunted [25,43].
Data Analysis
We carried out data exploration and analysis using SPSS (version 23.0, IBM SPSS Inc) and Arc-
GIS. To measure hunting offtake per block, we calculated the mean annual lion offtake per
block per 1000 km2 from 1996–2008.We calculated for 64 blocks the change in the annual lion
hunting offtake by using linear regression analysis to model changes over time using data on
the number of lions hunted per year between 1996 and 2008. We then used linear regression to
investigate whether annual rate of change in hunting offtake was influenced by annual lion
hunting offtake for the 43 blocks within SGR, having log-transformed the hunting offtakemet-
ric to meet the assumptions of the test. At the sectormanagement level, we used Kruskal-Wallis
tests to see if there were any differences per sector in government income, hunting offtake, or
proportional rate of change in hunting. We also used a Spearman’s rank test to measure the
correlation between government income per km2 per block and annual rate of change in lion
hunting offtake.We usedMann-Whitney U tests to investigate differences between 26 long-
term blocks and 17 short-term blocks in terms of hunting offtake, annual change in lion offtake
and government revenue.We did not include data from one hunting block, K5, for the analyses
of lion hunting offtake, as the lessee banned the hunting of lions in the block from 2002
onwards. We did use data from K5 in the analysis of income per SGR sector, as the lessee con-
tinued to hunt other species during the study period.
Results
Block Tenure
Twenty hunting companies were listed as leasing blocks in SGR between 1995 and 2009.
Twenty-six blocks were under long-term tenure and 17 blocks were under short-term tenure.
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Data on government income per block was only available for blocks within SGR and from
1996 to 2003 (listed in [38]). During this period government income from hunting activities
was dependent on six different fees. The two key fees are the trophy fee, which is the amount
paid when a targeted animal is killed, and the block fee, which is the fee paid annually by a
company to lease a block. From 1996 to 2003, government income was heavily reliant on tro-
phy fees (accounting for 59% of government income from hunting). The lion trophy fees
accounted for almost ten percent of the overall wildlife trophy fees. Block leases in 2003 were
only $7500 per block, regardless of size, and therefore only accounted for 11% of the govern-
ment income from hunting. Block fees increased to $12,000 in 2006, and then $27,000 in 2008,
and up to $60,000 in 2011.
Lion HuntingOfftake and Hunting Trends
Lion hunting offtake (number of lions shot per 1000 km2 per annum) was higher in blocks
inside than outside SGR (mean inside 1.8 ± 1.2; mean outside 1.1 ± 0.8). Offtake was especially
high in the north western part of SGR, within the Msolwa, Ilonga and Matambwe sectors
(Table 1). The annual change in lion hunting offtake was negatively related to the log10 number
of lions shot per 1000 km2 per block (N = 42, R2 = 0.317, p< 0.001; Figs 3 and 4, and Table 1),
with the model predicting that offtake is sustainable (i.e. where annual change is 0 or above)
when hunting is 0.92 lions per 1000 km2.
Sectors within SGR and Government Income fromTrophy Hunting
There was a difference in the income per SGR sector (N = 43, H = 27.40, 7 d.f., p< 0.001), pro-
portional annual change in lion offtake per sector (N = 43, H = 14.80, 7 d.f., p = 0.039), and
hunting offtake per sector (N = 43, H = 14.97, 7 d.f., p = 0.036). The sectors with the highest
lion hunting offtake experienced the steepest declines in hunting offtake from 1996–2008, but
provided the government with the greatest income per km2 from 1996 to 2003 (Table 1). Gov-
ernment income per km2 per block of SGR was negatively correlated with the annual rate of
change in lion hunting offtake (N = 43, rs = -0.62, p< 0.001). That is, blocks with the greatest
reduction in lion offtake from 1996–2008 generated the highest amount of government income
per km2 per annum from 1996–2003.
Table 1. Data on lion huntingofftakeper 1000km2, change in huntingofftake,and government incomeper km2 fromwithinSelousGameReserve
by sector.
Sector No. of Hunting
Blocks








Ilonga 10 7521 2.25 ± 1.48 -6% 130.16 ± 82.50
Kalulu 3 4989 0.86 ± 0.19 0% 26.57 ± 1.36
Kingupira 7 9345 1.82 ± 0.97 0% 65.08 ± 20.42
Likuyu
Seka
4 5025 1.36 ± 0.72 6% 44.85 ± 22.76
Liwale 4 4716 0.67 ± 0.28 3% 35.30 ± 17.32
Matambwe 3 1738 2.22 ± 1.53 -7% 134.09 ± 33.95
Miguruwe 3 6124 0.86 ± 0.43 1% 34.73 ± 13.56
Msolwa 9 4642 2.38 ± 1.14 -18% 135.27 ± 51.59
Total 43 44100 1.55 ± 0.70 - 75.75 ± 48.86
Mean lion hunting offtake (± standard deviation) from 1996 to 2008, annual rate of change (%) in hunting from 1996 to 2008, and mean government income
per km2 from 1996 to 2003 (± standard deviation). See Tables A & B in S1 File for the above data on a block by block basis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610.t001
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Block Tenure: Long-Term Versus Short-Term
Long-term blocks had a lower hunting offtake (long-termmean 1.41 ± 0.09 and short-term
mean 2.33 ± 1.38; N = 42, Z = -2.371, p = 0.018; Figs 4 and 5A) and annual change in lion off-
take (long-termmean -0.80 ± 10.99% and short-termmean -10.76 ± 13.36%; N = 42, Z =
-2.989, p = 0 .003; Figs 4 and 5B). Long-term blocks also provided the government with less
revenue (long-termmean per km2 was $62.20 ± 41.66; short-termmean per km2 was
$133.17 ± 71.20; N = 43, Z = -3.577, p< 0.001).
Discussion
Length of tenure has important implications for the sustainability of natural resource utiliza-
tion. Managers of areas under long-term tenure are more likely to maintain the long view and
husband their resources [29,48,49]. By contrast, the highest offtakes of hunted lion, and the
highest levels of income for the government, were recorded in blocks under short-term tenure.
Fig 3. Map showing annual change in annual lion hunting (1996–2008) in SelousGameReserve and surrounding blocks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610.g003
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However, this short-termism is driving the over-hunting of lions, leading to declines in the lion
population in these hunting blocks. The following sections will discuss this issue in more detail,
ending with recommendations on reforming the system.
Lion Conservation and Trophy Hunting Trends
The primary threats to large felids across Africa are thought to be retaliatory killing and habitat
loss [42,50–52]. However, over-hunting is also a possible cause of concern, especially in felid
species like the lion where infanticide is common [41,53]. Within the Selous ecosystem but out-
side SGR, it is clear that decreases in lion populations have occurred as a result of conflict with
people [47,54]. However, only recently has enough evidence been gathered to suggest that tro-
phy hunting of lions is having a negative impact on populations [25,43,55,56]. Lion trophy
hunting specifically targets adult males and sport hunters are extremely efficient in locating
Fig 4. Long-termversus short-termtenure in SelousGameReserve, shown as the annual rate of change in huntingofftake (%) and
lion huntingofftake.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610.g004
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their quarry. This has large impacts because the males that replace the hunted individuals in
the pride kill any cubs they have not fathered [25]. Recent research from Zambia suggests that
lion trophy hunting could be sustainable with a strategy that combines periods of recovery or
no hunting, a minimum age of at least seven years for trophy lions, and a quota of 0.5 lions per
1000km2 [57]. Similarly, research fromWest Africa suggests a quota of 1 lion per 1000km2
would be sustainable [58].
In terms of lion trophy hunting in Tanzania, and in SGR in particular, hunting levels peaked
in the late 1990s and declined by up to 50% in the following decade [25,43]. The SGR blocks
with the highest lion harvests per 1000 km2 showed the steepest declines in hunting (Figs 3 and
4). Trophy hunting since the late 1990s has had a negative impact on lion populations in SGR,
and research from across Tanzania suggests that the sustainable lion trophy hunting quota is
one lion per 1000km2 for SGR and half that for the rest of the country [25]. However, to
achieve this balance in the future it is important to understand why lion trophy hunting in
some areas of SGR is unsustainable and what is driving this process.
Government Income per Block
In Tanzania, the government has relied on trophy fees to raise income from trophy hunting,
rather than raising revenue through block fees [59]. Government regulations also stipulate that
companies have to achieve 40% of their overall quota or face penalties [16,38]. Hunting compa-
nies have been happy with this system, as it is easier to pass trophy fee costs to clients than it is
to transfer costs like block fees. However, the trophy fees for lion are higher than for other ani-
mals ($4900/lion in 2009) and this creates pressure for setting higher quotas, as increasing the
number of lion on quota greatly increases government income. This leads to higher lion hunt-
ing offtakes and then declines in offtake. Thus, the blocks with the greatest declines in lion tro-
phy hunting from 1996–2008 were the same blocks that provided the government with the
most income per km2 from 1996–2003.
Fig 5. Fig 5A. Lion hunting offtake (lions shot per 1000km2), long-termversus short-termblock tenure; Fig 5B. Annual rate of change in lion hunting offtake
from 1996 to 2008, long-termversus short-termtenure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162610.g005
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Length of tenure is closely associated with levels of income generated for the government.
Hunting blocks under short-term tenure (and in most cases subleased blocks) provided almost
twice the revenue per km2 than the blocks that have been under long-term stewardship ($133
per km2 short-term to $62 per km2 long-term). The Msolwa, Ilonga and Matambwe sectors of
SGR are those where the most subleasing occurs, and they provided the most revenue per km2
to government from 1996–2003 (see Table 1). However, these are also the sectors with the
highest lion hunting offtake and the greatest declines in annual lion hunting offtake from
1996–2008. Furthermore, over-hunting can have impacts on neighbouring unhunted areas
[55], where the empty territories, caused through hunting, act as population sinks, drawing in
lions from neighbouring areas. This suggests the high revenue in the short-term blocks
depended in part on there being long-term blocks with better managed lion populations.
Block Tenure
Hunting companies that have retained the same hunting blocks over 20 years are thought to
take a long-term view of managing their hunting opportunities [60]. This relationship is clearly
highlighted by our lion trophy hunting data. That is, when compared to short-term blocks,
long-term hunting blocks experience a lower offtake of hunted lions and a smaller annual
change in lion offtake between 1996–2008 (Figs 4 & 5). Ideally, our analysis would have
included data on lion densities and hunting effort per hunting block, as this would have
allowed a more in-depth assessment of lion hunting sustainability. However, such data were
not available and so instead we used results from a previous Tanzania-wide study on lion hunt-
ing levels and population changes to assess the sustainability of hunting in SGR [25]. We found
that the lion hunting offtake in the long-term blocks in SGRmatches the sustainable level of
one lion per 1000 km2 recommended in the previous study. Moreover, our results support this
recommendation, as offtake has been relatively constant from 1996–2008. In contrast, hunting
offtake in the short-term blocks is almost double the recommended level and offtake has
declined (Fig 5).
Data from specific blocks under short-term ownership also provide evidence of the relation-
ship between tenure and offtake. These blocks were predominantly on the western side of SGR
in the Msolwa and Ilonga sectors. They experiencedvery high hunting offtakes in the late
1990s and then subsequent declines in hunting offtake in the early 2000s. However, by 2009
parts of the Msolwa sector supported some of the highest lion densities in SGR [45]. It is
thought that the over-harvesting of the late 1990s had led to a scarcity of lions to hunt, which
made it difficult to attract clients to the blocks and allowed lion populations to recover by 2009.
The decision by the lessee in 2002 to stop hunting lions in a block in the heart of the Msolwa
sector (K5 on Fig 3) probably helped this recovery. Over the last few years several blocks that
were over-utilised have changed hands, to what is hoped will be more responsible owners.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Trophy hunting has had a negative impact on lion populations in SGR since the late 1990s, and
research suggests the sustainable lion trophy hunting quota is one lion per 1000km2 in SGR
[25]. Applying this in SGR would have only led to a slight decrease in the 2008 overall lion
hunting offtake, from ~50 lions a year to ~45 lions a year, but would have resulted in a much
more even spread in lion hunting across SGR between sectors and blocks under different
lengths of tenure.
The blocks in SGR with the highest lion hunting offtakes also experienced the steepest
declines in trophy offtake from 1996 to 2008 and tended to be under short-term tenure. These
high pressure hunting blocks, however, brought in the greatest amount of revenue for the
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government per km2 of area. The solution to this problem is not new, but involves adopting
the 1995 Policy and Management Plan for Tourist Hunting [61], which was accepted by the
then Director of Wildlife, but has yet to be implemented [60]. This would allocate hunting
blocks throughmarket-based competitive bidding (i.e. an auction) with a long-term lease of
ten years, thereby reducing the importance of trophy fees and moving away from the current
pay-as-you-use approach. Such recommendations remain pertinent, as Tanzania offered 28
new hunting blocks in May 2015, each on a three year lease [62], with a plan to assess all hunt-
ing blocks and potentially re-allocate them in 2018. The main drivers for such re-allocations
seem to be to generate increased revenue for the government and to increase the number of
Tanzanian nationals leasing blocks. Such goals are laudable but the allocation process must
also involve increased transparency in block allocation, income generation, hunting offtake
and quota setting. Otherwise,unsustainable hunting offtakes will continue.
Supporting Information
S1 File. Table A: Data on mean lion hunting offtake (± standard deviation), annual rate of
change in hunting from 1996 to 2008, and government income per km2 from 1996 to 2003
from within Selous Game Reserve by hunting block. Table B: Data on lion hunting offtake (±
standard deviation) and annual rate of change in blocks outside Selous Game Reserve (1996–
2008). Table C: Maximum offtake (1996–99), average offtake and quota per block (1996–2008)
in SGR. Figure A: Average number of lions shot per block in Selous Game Reserve and the
average lion hunting quota per block per year.
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